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Theratio of outstanding debt to gross national product in the United
States has shown essentially no time trend over a period measured not in
years but in decades. The research reported in this paper indicates that
lenders' portfolio behavior exhibits characteristics that couldprovide
aplausible explanation of this phenomenon.
Given the long-run stability of the U.S. economy's wealth in
relation to income, the question of lenders' behavior explaining the
stable aggregate debt—to--'income ratio turns on whether investors treat
debt and other assets as close or distant substitutes in their portfolios.
2nalysisof financial assets' respective risk properties indicates that
debt and equity are indeed sufficiently distant substitutes for lenders'
behavior to confine the debt—to—income ratio within relatively narrow
limits. In particular, the substitutability of debt and equity securities
is sufficiently limited that very large movements in expected return
differentials —movementsso large as presumably to elicit offsetting
responses from borrowers —wouldbe required to induce major changes
in the debt share of investors' aggregate portfolio, and hence in the
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The relationship between outstanding debt and economic activity has
attracted growing attention in recent years.In the United States the principal
focusof this attention thus far has been the empirical finding that, over time
horizons ranging from a calendar quarter to a year or two, the outstanding
indebtedness of all U.S. borrowers other than financial intermediaries bears as
closea relationship to incon and prices as does any of the more familiar monetary
aggregates or the monetary base) This finding has potentially important
implications for the conduct of monetary policy, and since 1983 the Federal
ReserveSystem's semi—annual reports to Congress have specified a growth range for
"domestic nonfinancial credit" along with the growth ranges for three monetary
aggregates.
A perhaps even more interesting aspect of the aggregate debt—to—income
relationship in the United States is that the simple ratio of the U.S. economy's
domestic nonfinancial debt to its gross national product has shown essentially no
time trend over a period measured not in years but in decades.2 This finding bears
potentially important implications for fiscal policy, especially in anera of
federalbudget deficits that are large enough to increase rapidly the federal
government's outstanding indebtedness in relation to- GNP.3 It is puzzling,
however, in that manyof the factors that familiar theory suggests would determine
an economy's proclivity to finance its activity by issuing debt —forexample,
aggregate risk levels, tax rates, and bankruptcy arrangements —have changed
dramatically over the decades during which the U.S. domestic nonfinancial debt
ratiohas remained approximately flat.
nypotential explanation for this phenomenon must, of course, focus on the
behaviorof lenders (debt holders) or borrowers (debt issuers) or both.The
object of the research summarized in this paper is to see whether the behavior—2—
of investors in the U.S. financial markets could plausibly account for the economy's
relatively stable debt-to—income ratio. This question turns on whether investors
treat debt and other assets as close or distant substitutes in their portfolios.
To anticipate, analysis of financial assets' respective risk properties
indicates that debt and equity are indeed sufficiently distant substitutes for
lenders' behavior to be a plausible source of the constraint confining the debt—
to-income ratio within relatively narrow limits. At the same time, nothing in
this finding precludes the possibility that borrowers' behavior could also be an
equally or even more important part of the overall explanation.
I. Asset Risk and Asset Substitutability
The key link to lenders' behavior exploited here is the well known fact that
the U.S. economy's total wealth—to—income ratio has been essentially trendless
for many decades, as would be implied by the life cycle model of saving under
standard conditions describing a mature (albeit growing)economy.4 Over substantial
periods of time, therefore, a stable debt—to—income ratio is equivalent to a
stable share of debt assets in the economy's aggregate portfolio. In terms
of familiar portfolio theory, if investors' behavior is imposing this constraint
then the relevant substitution elasticities must be small (in absolute value) in
comparison with the corresponding wealth and/or income elasticities. Wnether in
fact they are so is an empirical question.
According to the standard theory describing the portfolio behavior of risk-
averse investors, the relevant asset substitutabilities that matter here depend
on investors' perceptions of the risk associated with holding debtand other
assets. Investors' willingness to hold different assets depends on their
assessments of the respective risks to which holding these assets exposes them,
and their treatment of some assets as substitutes for others in their portfolios
likewise depends on the relationships they perceive among the associated risks to
holding these assets as well as others. If two assets expose holders to essentially—3—
the same set of risks, investors typically treat the two as close substitutes and
allocate their portfolios accordingly. Assets subject to quite disparate risks are
typically more distant substitutes, or perhaps even complements.
Thebasic framework of analysis used hereis the familiar discrete—time theory
relatingrisk—averse portfolio choice to expected asset returns. The investor's
single—period objective, given initial wealth W, is to choose a vectorof asset
holdingproportions a ,satisfyinga '1= 1,to maximize expected utility EIIU(W l• t t
Under the conditions that U (W) is any power or logarithmic function (so that the
Pratt—arrow coefficient of relative risk aversjon is constant), that the investor
perceivesthe vector of real net asset returns r to bedistributed normally (or
lognormaily)with expectation re and variance_covariance structure Q, and that no
available asset is riskiess in real terms,5 solution of this problem yields
=B(r+1)+IL (1) tt t
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for purposes of the underlying expansion, then the first (scalar) term within brackets
in (2) is simply the reciprocal of the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Matrix in (1), expressing the response of each proportional asset demand
to movements in the expected real returns on that and other assets, contains the
setof relative asset substitutabilities that determine how stable the respective
sharesof the typical investor's portfolio will be. The solution for Bin (2) makes
clear the central role of investors' risk perceptions in governing this behavior.
The asset substitutabilities in Bdepend only on the investor's risk aversion and
risk perceptions, here parameterized by a variance-covariance matrix that in—4—
generalmayvaryover time.
II.SubstitutabilityAmong FinancialAssets
The upper panel of Table 1 shows the variances and covariances, calculated
from quarterly data for 1960—80, of the realized after—tax real per annum returns on
three broad classes of U.S. financial assets that differ fundamentally from one
another according to the risks associated with holding them: Short-term debt Cs)
includes all assets bearing real returns that are risky, over a single year or
calendarquarter, only because of uncertainty about inflation. Long-term debt (L)
isrisky because of uncertainty not only about inflation but also about changes
in asset prices directly reflecting changes in market interest rates. Equity (E)
is risky because of uncertainty about inflation and about changes in stockprices.6
The lower panel of Table 1 indicates the iilications of this observed
1960—80 covariance structure for investors' portfolio behavior by showing the
transformation of Q given in (2), up to but not including multiplication by the
reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Apart from the risk
aversion coefficient, these values for B indicate the marginal responses of the
proportional portfolio allocations c. to changes in expected asset returnsre.
Hencethey also indicate by what anount the structure of expected returns would have
to change in order to induce any given shift in the conosition of the typical
investor v5portfolio.
For plausible values of the risk aversion coefficient, the B values
shownin Table 1 indicatethat short- and long-term debt are fairly close
substitutesfor one another, but not for equity. For relative risk aversion equal
tofour,7 for example, the increase in the expected short—term debt return
(relative to the two other returns) that would be required to raise the short—
plus-long debt share of the typical investor's portfolio by .01 is .63%. The
corresponding required increase in the expected long—term debt return is .27%.
Because the model is linear in expected returns, the analogous increase requiredTABLE 1
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to generate greater portfolio shifts are proportionally greater.
One potentially serious shortcoming of drawing such inferences on the basis
of an unconditional sample variance-covariance structure is that it attributes too
little information to investors by disregarding their knowledge, at each point in
time, of the most recent realizations of asset returns and their principal
determinants. During the 1960-80 period the after—tax real returns on all three
classes of assets considered here ethibited substantial serialcorrelation.8 en
returns are serially correlated, information about the most recent actual values is
a useful ingredient in forming expectations about returns in the immediate future.
Ignoring that information can lead to excessively large estimates of the uncertainty
surrounding these expectations.
Table 2 presents a set of analogous results based on a procedure that takes
much more careful account of what information investors did and did not have at any
particulartime. 2sof the beginning of each calendar quarter,investors presumably
know the stated interest rates on short—term debt instruments, the current prices
and the coupon rates on long—term debt instruments, the current prices and
(approximately) the dividends on equities, and the relevant tax rates. The three
uncertainelements that they must forecast over the coming quarter, in order to form
expectatations of the after—tax real returns on the three broad classes of assets
consideredhere, are inflation, the capital gain or loss due to changing bond prices,
and the capital gain or loss due to changing stock prices.
The procedure underlying the results reported in Table 2 represents investors
asforming expectations of these three uncertain return elements, at each point in
tirr, by estimating a linear regression model relating each element to past values
of itself and the other two, using all data observed through the immediately
preceding period.9 In addition to providing forecast values of the threeuncertain
elements for the period ahead, the linear regression model at each point in time
also directly indicates the variances and covariances associated with the forecastsThBLE 2
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derived in this way. After each period elapses, investors can then repeat the same
procedure, incorporating the one new observation on inflationand on long—term
debt and equity capital gains into the data usedtore-estimate the linear
regression model to make forecasts for the next period.
Given the simple arithmetic connection between asset returns and these
underlying uncertain elements, and given investors' presumed knowledge ofthe
other elements comprising returns, these one—period—ahead forecasts of inflation
and the respective capital gains on long-term debt and equity directly imply one-
period—ahead forecasts of the after—tax real returns on all threeclasses of assets
at each point In time. Similarly, the variances and covariancesassociated with
the forecasts of inflation and the two capital gains directly imply thevariances
and covariances associated with the corresponding forecasts of the threeasset
returns.
The upper panel of Table 2 shows the means of these implied return variances
and covarianceS for the 84 quarterS of the sample. These values aresmaller than
the corresponding values shown in Table 1, indicating the importance ofinvestors'
having (and using) information about recent actual returns.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the transformation of this Q given in
(2), again up to but not including multiplication by the risk aversion reciprocal.
The reduced uncertainty, in comparison with Table 1, makes investors more willing to
re—allocate their portfolios in response to changes in expected returns. Even so,
most of the asset substituability is still between short- and long—term debt. With
relative risk aversion again equal to four, the increases in the expected returns
on short- and long-term debt required (individually) to raise the overall debt share
of the typical investor's portfolio by .01 are .25% and .20%, respectively.
III. Substitutability Between Financial and Nonfinancial Assets
An important limitation of the analysis reported in Section II is its
restriction to financial assets only. On a net basis, most of the total U.S.—7-.
nationalwealth that has remained relatively stable in relation to U.S. economic
activity consists of nonfinancial assets. Even for the household sector alone,
yearend 1980 total wealth included $2.8 trillion of residential real estate and $1.0
trillion of consumer durables in addition to $3.5 trillion of financial assets. If
wealth holders are willing to substitute not just among financial assets but also
between financial and nonfinancial assets, then the results presented in Section II
presumablyoverstate the movements in the expected return structure required to
change the share of debt in their portfolios,and hence also overstate the likely
resulting stability of aggregate debt holdings in relation to either wealth or
income.
Table 3 presents the results of applying the forecasting procedure underlying
Table 2 to the after—tax real returns on the same three classes of financial
assets together with two classes of nonfinancial assets, residential real estate
(H) and consumer durables CD), based on annual data for 1964_8l)0 Apart from the
useof an annual time unit, thetreatment of the uncertain elements of the
financialasset returns is just analogous to that described in Section II. In
orderto generate forecasts of the respective returns on housing and durables,
however,the forecasting equation here also includes the change in the constant—
qualityhousing price index and the change in the implicit price deflator for durables.
Not surprisingly, given the role of inflation in makingassetreturns
uncertain,the resulting variance—covariance matrix shown in the upper panel of
Table 3 indicates that both categories of nonfinancial assets are less risky in real
terms than any of the three financial assets. More importantly for the purposes of
the analysis here, the transformation of this variance—covariance structure shown
in the lower panel of the table indicates that the implied responsiveness of portfolio
allocations to changes in expected returns is far greater than suggested by the
analysis in Section II of financial assets alone. With relative risk aversion equal
tofour, the increase in the expected short—term debt return (again, relative to
allother returns) required to raise the total debt share of the typical investor'sTABLE 3









.47 1.24 4.47 1.19
r .67 1.87 2.99 .16 .27
portfolio poI1ei1.LL1X
r r r r r







34.0 6.79 —2.95 168
aD
—191 2.12 7.13—206 387
Notes: See Table 1.—8—
portfolio by .01 is only .025%. A comparison of the elements in the first column of
thematrix makes clearthatmore than all of this portfolio re—allocation occurs
at the expense of the share invested in durables. Because of the cross—effects of
thesubstitutability of short—term debt with both durables and long—term debt, however,
the corresponding movement in the expected long—term debt return required to raise
the total debt share by .01 is a decline of .48%.
IV. Conclusions
Whether or not investors' behavior can plausibly account for the U.S.economy's
trendless debt—to—income ratio depends crucially on theproper treatment of wealth
holding in nonfinancial forms. Among financial assets only, the substitutability
of debt and equity securities is sufficiently limited thatvery large movements
in expected return differentials —movementsso large as presumably to elicit
offsetting responses from borrowers —would be required to induce major changes in
the debt share of investors' aggregate portfolio. Given the long-runstability
of the economy's wealth in relation to income, this lack of assetsubstitutability
along the relevant dimension also inlies a stable debt—to—income ratio.
By contrast, a parallel analysis applied to financial and nonfinancial
assets together suggests that only quite modest movements in thestructure of
expected returns would suffice to induce even very large changes in the debt
share of total assets, and hence in the aggregate debt—to—incomeratio. The main
reason for this result is the close substitutability of short-term debtand
consumer durables implied by the respective risks associated with thesetwo assets'
after—tax real returns,
Especially since the key substitutubility on which this difference hinges
is to durables, rather than housing, the most sensibleinterpretation of these
results is probably to discount the findings including nonfinancialassets and
conclude that the portfolio behavior of risk—averse investorscan plausibly
account for a stable debt share of assets, and hence also (given thestability—9—
of wealth in relation to income in the United States) the observed stabledebt-to—
income ratio. Onereasonfor drawing this conclusion is simply that asset—type
considerations of risk and return alone probably do not constitute an adequate
description of the demand for consumer durables. In a more fully developed
description of that demand, the willingness to substitute holdings of short—term
debtinstruments for ownership of consumer durables would no doubt be much more
limited. A second reason is that, to a far greater extent than in the case of
return indexes for aggregates of financial assets (or even housing), thevariation
ofthereturnindex for the aggregate of all consunr durables presumably understates
therisk associated with any individual's holding. A more accurate representation
of that risk would also probably indicate less correlation with other asset risks,
hence less substitutability for other assets, and hence less responsiveness of asset
demands to changes in relative returns.
Withthis qualification, therefore, the behavior of lenders in the U.S.
financial market doesexhibit characteristics that could account for the observed
stabilityof the economyt saggregate debt—to—income ratio over long periods of time.
Thisconclusion, however, in no way precludes the behavior of borrowers being as
important,or more so, inexplaining this phenomenon. Thatpossibilityremains a
subjectfor future research.Footnotes
*1 am grateful to Jeff Fuhrer for research assistance to him, Andrew Abeland James
Earley for helpful coimnents on a preliminary draft, and to the National Science
Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for researchsupport.
1. See, for example, the evidence in Friedman (1983).
2. The typical value for the U.S. domestic nonfinancial debt ratio is about1.45;
see again, for example, Friedman (1983)
3. The federal governinentts debt ratio declined (as is usual in peacetime) froma
peak of 1.03 in 1946 to a low of .25 in 1974. At yearend 1980 it was still .27.
By midyear 1984 it had risen to .35.
4. See Modigliani (1966) for a clear exposition of this proposition ata theoretical
level, and, for example, Goldsmith (forthcoming) for empirical evidence. The
U.S. wealth-to-income ratio is typically around three.
5. Alternatively, if one asset is riskless, it is necessary to partition the asset
demand system so that the expression equivalent to (1) gives the demands for
risky assets only.In that case
1
replaces the second (matrix) term in (2),
and r in (3) is a vector of zeroes.
6.See Friedman (1984) for details of the construction of these three after—tax
real return series.
7.This value is about in the middle of the range of available empirical estimates.
Friend and Blume (1975) suggested a value in excess of two, Grossman and Shiller
(1981) suggested four, and Friend and Hasbrouck (1982) suggested six.
8. The first—order serial correlation coefficients are .86 for short-term debt, .51
for long-term debt, and .33 for equity.
9. See Friedman (1984) for details of the estimated vector autoregression and the
calculations based on it.
10.The nominal after-tax return for housing combines the BEA implicit rent and
depreciation series, the FEA series on maintenance costs, the MPS series on
property taxes, and changes in the Census Bureau constant—quality price index,using Barro and Sahasakul's (1983) average marginal income tax rate series.
The nominal (untaxed) return on durables combines the BEA service value estimate
and changes in the relevant BEA deflator. In both cases the corresponding real
return follows from subtracting the percentage change in the consuirr price
index. Use of an annual time unit in this part of the analysis reflects the
unavailability of several of these series on a quarterly basis.
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